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Disenfranchisement as Punishment: European Court of Human Rights, UK 
and Canadian Responses to Prisoner Voting 
 
Jacqueline S. Hodgson and Kent Roach 
 
 
“No one should be in any doubt: prisoners are not getting the vote under this 
Government.”  
David Cameron, Prime Minister (Prime Minister’s Questions 24 October 2012) 
 
Whether or not prisoners should enjoy the right to vote is a controversial subject 
in many democracies but perhaps none more so than in the UK.  The issue pits 
the civil and political rights of some of the most unpopular citizens within society 
against the strong desire of Parliament to restrict and to limit those rights. In this 
paper, we examine how the UK has for a decade been able to avoid responding to 
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), domestic courts, and 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), that a complete ban on 
prisoner voting rights contravenes the First Protocol to the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union and the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA).  Much of the debate has 
focused on Parliamentary resistance to the rulings, but we argue that the 
European and domestic courts bear a good deal of responsibility for this state of 
affairs.   
We make two arguments in this respect.  First, although holding the UK ban on 
prisoner voting to be in breach of the ECHR, the ECtHR in Hirst v UK (No. 2)1 
failed to engage fully with the principled arguments around prisoner 
disenfranchisement, including those set out by the Canadian Supreme Court in 
Sauvé v Canada, a decision it explicitly approved.2 The majority of the Court in 
Sauvé expressed serious misgivings about whether the state’s objectives in 
promoting respect for the rule of law and civic responsibility, and imposing 
additional punishment on prisoners, were important enough to justify any 
prisoner disenfranchisement. However, without assessing fully the legitimacy of 
these arguments when asserted in Hirst, the ECtHR accepted them uncritically, 
focusing instead on how to ensure that prisoner disenfranchisement was 
proportionate, rather than confronting the logically prior question of whether 
any prisoner should be denied the right to vote.   
Second, in sanctioning prisoner disenfranchisement without any proper 
assessment of the underlying rationale, the ECtHR has adopted what we suggest 
is a thin and impoverished form of proportionality reasoning.  Through a series 
of decisions subsequent to Hirst (No.2), the Court has back-tracked from its 
                                                        
1 Hirst v UK (No.2) 74025/01 [2005] ECHR 2260. 
2 Sauvé v Canada [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 
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initially robust stance, to the point where any restriction short of full 
disenfranchisement will be considered proportionate.  Furthermore, it has 
weakened its primary means of enforcing the ruling in Hirst (No.2). Despite a 
decade of stalling on the part of the UK government, the ECtHR’s refusal to award 
damages and costs to British prisoners who continue to be denied the vote 
removes what the UK government acknowledged was a powerful incentive to 
enact reform.  In this way, the ECtHR has been, in our view, too accommodating 
to the UK government’s opposition to prisoner voting.  This has had the 
unintended effect of rewarding Parliament for its disregard of the decisions of 
the ECtHR and so its continued breach of the Convention. 
Others have written eloquently on the broader context within which the debate 
on prisoner voting rights has taken place, including the challenges to the role of 
the ECtHR and to Britain’s continuing membership of the Council of Europe.3  
Our focus here is on the flawed approach of the ECtHR and the UK courts in 
failing to take seriously whether interference with prisoners’ voting rights 
pursues a legitimate aim, directing their attention instead to the second limb of 
the test, the proportionality of any such measure. Underpinning this approach is 
an apparent desire to encroach as little as possible on Parliament’s legislative 
powers, and so to appease a UK government hostile to the rulings of the ECtHR 
as a supra-national court on this issue. In contrast, the Canadian approach has 
allotted a stronger role for the judiciary in the interpretation of a constitutional 
bill of rights and so has been more willing to tackle the justifications for prisoner 
disenfranchisement advanced by the legislature. 
The ECtHR’s Approach to Prisoner Voting Rights in Hirst (No. 2) and Beyond 
Whilst prisoners in the UK have been disenfranchised in one form or another 
since the 19th century (sometimes characterised as a form of ‘civic death’), 
Britain has only recently been found to be in breach of its international human, 
civil and political rights obligations.  Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the ECHR sets 
out the right to free elections: 
The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable 
intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free 
expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature. 
                                                        
3 See, for example, Bates, E. “Analysing the Prisoner Voting Saga and the British 
Challenge to Strasbourg” Human Rights Law Review 14 (2014) 503; Bryan, G. 
“Lions under the throne: the constitutional implications of the debate on 
prisoner enfranchisement” Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative 
Law 2 (2013) 274; Fredman, S. “From dialogue to deliberation: human rights 
adjudication and prisoners' rights to vote” Public Law (2013) 292; Bratza, N. 
“The relationship between the UK courts and Strasbourg” European Human 
Rights Law Review (2011) 505. Also, discussed below, Finnis, J. “Judicial Law-
Making and the ‘Living’ Instrumentalisation of the ECHR” in NW Barber, Richard 
Elkins and Paul Yowell eds Lord Sumption and the Limits of the Law (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2016); Finnis, J. “Prisoners’ Voting Rights and Judges’ Power” Oxford 
Legal Research Paper 58/2015. 
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Adopting a purposive approach to the interpretation of the Protocol, the ECtHR 
has held that this provision guarantees citizens a right to vote.  It is accepted by 
the ECtHR that states enjoy a broad margin of appreciation to define the 
parameters of enfranchisement – not just for prisoners, but also on other 
grounds such as age and residency.  However, any interference with voting rights 
must be in pursuit of a legitimate aim and must be proportionate.   
The majority of European countries have no disenfranchisement of prisoners;4 
others reserve the power to disenfranchise some prisoners; and a minority of 
countries automatically deprive all convicted prisoners of the right to vote.5  
Those that adopt an intermediate approach typically impose restrictions when 
convicted of certain types of crime that are considered either the most serious, 
or undermine the democratic functioning of the state in some way;6 or when 
sentences of a certain length are imposed; and others have restrictions which are 
relatively harsh and extend even beyond the period of imprisonment, such as 
Italy’s lifetime ban for those sentenced to more than five years’ imprisonment.  
The reason why the UK position has been deemed unacceptable is because it 
applies to all convicted prisoners irrespective of the nature and gravity of the 
offence committed or the length of the jail term imposed; the ECtHR has held this 
to be arbitrary and disproportionate. 
In Hirst v UK (No. 2), the Grand Chamber held that the UK was in breach of Article 
3 of protocol 1. The Government argued that there is a wide margin of 
appreciation to decide the conditions under which the right may be exercised 
and removing prisoners’ right to vote falls within this.  The Government case was 
that disqualification is intended to prevent crime, to punish offences, enhance 
civic responsibility and promote respect for the law.  The ECtHR accepted these 
objectives as legitimate without subjecting them to any critical analysis.  
However, the Grand Chamber went on to reject the Government’s argument that 
the ban is proportionate because it affects only those convicted of sufficiently 
serious crimes warranting immediate imprisonment. This was the first case that 
dealt with “a general and automatic disenfranchisement of prisoners” (at para. 
68) and the Court noted that the Venice Commission had recommended that 
prisoners should only be deprived of the right to vote on a case-by-case basis by 
judicial decision.  Prisoners retain their Convention rights and any restrictions 
must be clearly justified. A case-by-case approach would also ensure that the 
various purposes of punishment were assessed and balanced as applied to 
specific offenders and their crimes. However, the bulk of the Grand Chamber’s 
                                                        
4 See the Appendix to White (2014).  Also Hirst (No. 2), para 33-34; Scoppola v 
Italy (No. 3) 126/05 [2012] ECHR 868 paragraphs 45-48. 
5 The UK, Armenia, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary and Russia.  Also San 
Marino and Liechtenstein. 
6 Eg France (specified crimes include crimes against humanity, terrorism, 
murder, manslaughter, rape and other sexual assaults, drug trafficking, human 
trafficking, extortion, fraud, criminal damage, espionage, offences against 
government, breach of duty by civil servants, perverting the course of justice.)  
Germany’s ban extends to prisoners whose crimes target the integrity of the 
state or the democratic order e.g. political insurgents. 
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analysis in Hirst (No. 2) was directed to its application of principles of 
proportionality,7 which require a discernible and sufficient link between the 
sanction imposed and the conduct and circumstances of the individual 
disenfranchised.  Disenfranchisement was not imposed by the UK trial courts 
and it is not clear that there is any link between the automatic 
disenfranchisement of the estimated 48,000 then serving prisoners, and the facts 
of their cases or the gravity of their crime.8  Such a general, automatic and 
indiscriminate ban falls outside of any margin of appreciation. 
Moving to an Impoverished Proportionality Analysis 
In the 2010 case of Frodl v Austria,9 the ECtHR adopted a bolder analysis. It 
accepted that there was a wide margin of appreciation, but set several criteria 
that must be respected if the voting rights of prisoners are restricted.  
Disenfranchisement may only be envisaged for a rather narrowly defined group 
of offenders serving a lengthy term of imprisonment; there should be a direct 
link between the facts on which a conviction is based and the sanction of 
disenfranchisement; and such a measure should preferably be imposed not by 
operation of a law, but by the decision of a judge following judicial proceedings.  
However, this robust interpretation, which even defenders of prisoner 
disenfranchisement such as Professor Finnis recognized was a “gain in 
integrity”,10 as it required disenfranchisement to be imposed by judges as a form 
of punishment, was not to last. 
The UK government was subsequently permitted to intervene in Scoppola v Italy 
(No. 3) urging the Grand Chamber to overrule Hirst (No. 2). The ECtHR declined 
to do so, but held that an automatic lifetime ban (though there is a right of 
appeal) for Italian prisoners sentenced to more than five years imprisonment 
was not disproportionate. Again accepting the legitimacy of the legislature’s 
objectives, the Court found that Italian law showed a concern to adjust the 
application of the ban to the particular circumstances of the case, taking account 
of factors such as offence gravity and the conduct of the offender, and so was 
proportionate. 
However, although affirming its decision in Hirst (No. 2) that a total ban on 
prisoner voting was disproportionate, the Grand Chamber disapproved the 
interpretation of that decision by the Court in Frodl.  It rejected the assertion that 
prisoner disenfranchisement provisions must be applied by a judge in order to 
ensure proportionality, noting that only 11 of 24 jurisdictions that deny 
prisoners the vote require a judicial decision. 
While the intervention of a judge is in principle likely to guarantee the 
proportionality of restrictions on prisoners’ voting rights, such restrictions 
will not necessarily be automatic, general and indiscriminate simply 
                                                        
7 The legitimacy of the government’s aims is dealt with in Hirst (No. 2), 
paragraphs 74-75. 
8 Note that the adult prison population has increased significantly since Hirst (No. 
2) and now stands at around 66,000. 
9 20201/04 [2010] ECHR 508. 
10 John Finnis “Judicial Law-Making” supra n.3 at 99. 
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because they were not ordered by a judge.  Indeed, the circumstances in 
which the right to vote is forfeited may be detailed in the law, making its 
application conditional on such factors as the nature or gravity of the 
offence committed. (para 99) 
This represented a partial climb down from its earlier decision and one that was 
much more accepting of allowing Parliament, as opposed to the judiciary, to 
resolve the question of prisoner voting by restricting the vote for a particular 
subset of prisoners. 
The ECtHR’s retreat from Hirst (No. 2) demonstrates the hollowness of its 
reasoning. It claims to assess the legitimacy and proportionality of any 
restriction, but in practice, adopts an arbitrary approach in holding as 
proportionate anything short of a complete ban on voting. It does not take 
seriously the requirement to demonstrate that any restriction is in pursuit of 
legitimate aims. By moving straight to line drawing, the Court avoids the logically 
prior question of why any prisoner should be denied the vote. This feature 
makes the jurisprudence unsatisfactory both to defenders of prisoner 
disenfranchisement, such as Finnis,11 and those such as ourselves who are not 
convinced by Parliament’s reasons for denying any prisoner a vote. 
The Retreat on Damages and Costs 
The ECtHR’s retreat from Hirst (No. 2) was also manifested in its remedial 
decisions. Initially, the Court seemed likely to take fairly aggressive measures to 
induce the UK to enact legislation that would prevent repeated violations of 
prisoners’ right to vote. Even modest damage awards for every prisoner denied a 
vote in every election would add up to considerable sums.   In Greens and M.T. v 
UK, however, the ECtHR suspended individual proceedings by the 2,500 
prisoners seeking remedies for their disenfranchisement under its pilot 
judgment procedure, declining to award any damages to prisoners who 
continued to be denied the vote.12  
The Court also hinted that contrary to prior dicta that suggested that only 
judicial determinations depriving prisoners of the vote might be found 
proportionate, any legislative reform would be evaluated on a wide margin of 
appreciation. It concluded (at paragraph 115) that the UK should introduce 
legislative proposals within six months of the date on which the judgment 
became final, subsequently extended to six months from the delivery of the 
Grand Chamber’s judgment in Scoppola.  
The ECtHR then abandoned another lever it had to persuade the UK government 
to respond to Hirst (No. 2): the possibility to award thousands of prisoners 
damages for being denied the right to vote once the suspension of the 
                                                        
11 He suggests that the ECtHR’s proportionality reasoning “lacks competence and 
care” and is “empty” and even “irrational”. John Finnis “Judicial Law-Making” 
supra n.3 at 97, 100. 
12 Greens and M.T. v UK   60041/08 and 60054/08 [2010] ECHR 182. It did, 
however, award €5,000 for legal costs. 
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applications that followed from the use of the pilot judgment procedure in 
Greens and M.T. v UK expired.  
In Firth v UK,13 the Court denied ten UK prisoners’ claim for damages, tersely 
concluding that “in the vast majority” of past voting rights cases, “the Court 
expressly declined to make any award of damages. The Court concluded that the 
finding of a violation constitutes sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary 
damage sustained by the applicants” (paragraph 18). To add insult to injury, it 
also denied the applicants their legal costs.14  In the most recent case of McHugh 
and others v UK, brought by 1,015 prisoners, the Court made the same finding of 
a violation of Article 3 of protocol No. 1, but again rejected the claim for 
compensation and for legal costs.15 
The ECtHR’s recent decisions in Firth and McHugh are unfortunate on many 
levels including on the strategic basis that multiple damage awards had been one 
of the motivating factors behind the government’s claims that they would 
comply with Hirst (No. 2). The then Prime Minister’s comments in Parliament on 
the issue in November 2010 are most famous for his expression of disgust at the 
thought of prisoners voting, but they also reveal his concerns about possible 
damage awards. 
The Prime Minister: I completely agree with my hon. Friend. It makes me 
physically ill even to contemplate having to give the vote to anyone who is 
in prison. Frankly, when people commit a crime and go to prison, they 
should lose their rights, including the right to vote. But we are in a 
situation that I am afraid we have to deal with. This is potentially costing 
us £160 million, so we have to come forward with proposals, because I do 
not want us to spend that money; it is not right. So, painful as it is, we 
have to sort out yet another problem that was just left to us by the last 
Government.16  
In February 2011, legal advice affirming the prospect of large damage awards 
was also leaked. 17  There were some such as Conservative MP Dominic Raab, 
who counselled the government simply not to pay any damage award,18 but such 
a prospect would have seriously compounded the international discredit to the 
UK over this issue.  
                                                        
13 Firth and others v UK  47784/09, 47806/09, 47812/09, 47818/09, 47829/09, 
49001/09, 49007/09, 49018/09, 49003/09 and 49036/09, 2014 ECHR 874 . 
14 The Court considered that lodging these violation applications was essentially 
repetitive of earlier claims and so straightforward, not requiring legal assistance.  
The legal costs claimed had not, therefore, been reasonably and necessarily 
incurred. 
15 51987/08 and 1,014 others, 10 February 2015. 
16 H.C. Deb 3 Nov 2010 c921 
17 ‘Cameron is clear to defy Europe on human rights’, The Times, 18 February 
2011. 
18 He argued: “what happens if we agree to the motion?...There is no risk of a fine 
and no power to enforce compensation, and absolutely no chance of being kicked 
out of the Council of Europe.” H.C. Deb 10 Feb 2011, c 583-4. 
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Through these decisions, the ECtHR has accommodated the UK Parliament’s 
determination to allow it, rather than the judiciary, to resolve the controversial 
prisoner voting right question. By declining to award just satisfaction to 
prisoners who continue to be disenfranchised, it has also rewarded Parliament’s 
refusal to implement Hirst (No. 2). More substantively, the ECtHR accepted 
without scrutiny the legitimacy of the legislative objectives for prisoner 
disenfranchisement both in Hirst (No. 2) and subsequent cases. In the next 
section, we suggest that the Canadian decision cited with approval in Hirst (No. 
2) (but tellingly not in subsequent cases from Strasbourg) took a much more 
critical and sceptical view of the claim that Parliament would be justified in 
denying the vote to prisoners in order to punish them and to increase respect for 
the rule of law. 
The Canadian Sauvé Decision 
The issue of prisoner voting rights emerged as a legal and political issue 
somewhat earlier in Canada, and the debate has assumed a more substantive 
character than that in the UK, interrogating both the aims and the means of 
disenfranchisement. 
Section 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, a bill of rights added to 
the Canadian Constitution in 1982, provides that all citizens have the right to 
vote in federal and provincial elections. Under section 1, all Charter rights are 
subject to reasonable limits that are demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society. Like the margin of appreciation in interpreting the First 
Protocol of the ECHR, this limitation clause has been interpreted as requiring the 
government to demonstrate that any law that places limits on Charter rights is 
enacted to pursue an objective that is important enough to justify violation of 
rights and that the law is a proportionate implementation of such objectives. The 
elements of proportionality are familiar ones: the law must be rationally 
connected to the objective; limit the rights as little as reasonably possible while 
achieving the objective; and there must be an appropriate overall balance.19 
In 1993, the Supreme Court of Canada struck down a ban on all prisoners voting 
in federal elections, a ban identical to the one found to be incompatible with the 
ECHR in Hirst (No. 2). The Court was extremely laconic in its reasoning: the law 
was “drawn too broadly and fails to meet the proportionality test, particularly 
the minimal impairment component of the test, as expressed in the s.1 
jurisprudence of the Court.”20 It thus avoided engaging with the more 
substantive reasoning of the Ontario and Federal Courts of Appeal, which the 
previous year had held unanimously that the ban on all prisoners voting was 
unconstitutional and that the government’s proffered objectives for prisoner 
disenfranchisement - punishing prisoners and maintaining the sanctity and 
integrity of the franchise - were not important enough to justify limiting a 
Charter right.  
                                                        
19 R v Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 
20 Sauvé v Canada (Attorney General), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 438 
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In the Ontario Court of Appeal, Justice Louise Arbour, who would later serve on 
the Supreme Court of Canada and as UN High Commissioner of Human Rights, 
expressed doubts that anyone could be deprived of the vote simply because they 
were judged not to be “decent and responsible”21. She noted that women and 
those who did not own property had previously been disenfranchised on such 
vague and subjective grounds. She also dismissed the idea that prisoner 
disenfranchisement was necessary to maintain the integrity of the voting process, 
pointing out that many prisoners were well informed about political issues while 
other voters were not. She also expressed scepticism about the retributive 
punishment rationale for disenfranchisement by noting that disenfranchisement 
punished people for being in prison when an election was held, not on the basis 
of the specific nature of the crime.22 The Canadian Parliament ignored these 
substantive concerns and quickly put in place a new law, this time only taking 
the vote away from prisoners serving sentences of two years or more - 
traditionally the distinction between short-term prisoners who serve their 
sentences in provincial correctional facilities, and those who serve their 
sentences in prisons run by the federal government. The applicant, Richard 
Sauvé, was serving a sentence of life imprisonment for murder and so remained 
unable to vote. However, he successfully challenged the new law in a 
controversial 5:4 decision by the Supreme Court of Canada in 2002. 
Although cited by the ECtHR in support of their decision in Hirst (No. 2), in our 
view, the Canadian 2002 decision is best justified not on proportionality 
principles that focus on whether the legislature has adopted the least restrictive 
means, but on the basis of the illegitimacy of Parliament’s “vague and symbolic”23 
aims in enacting the legislation. Like the UK government in Hirst (No. 2), the 
Canadian government argued in Sauvé that its objectives in prisoner 
disenfranchisement were to enhance civic responsibility and respect for the rule 
of law, and to provide additional punishment – the same objectives that two 
Canadian Courts of Appeal in 1992 rejected as insufficiently important to justify 
limiting the right to vote.  In the second Sauvé case, the majority decision of the 
Supreme Court delivered by Chief Justice McLachlin was also critical of these 
objectives and considerably more critical than the ECtHR would be in Hirst (No. 
2). In other words, the Supreme Court’s second Sauvé case is best seen as a case 
not about the line drawing of proportionality, but whether Parliament had 
advanced sufficiently important objectives to justify depriving any prisoner of 
the vote. 
Chief Justice McLachlin stressed that not all legislative objectives were legitimate 
and that, “a simple majoritarian political preference for abolishing a right 
altogether would not be a constitutionally valid objective.” She then indicated 
that Parliament’s aims of increasing respect for civic responsibility and the rule 
of law through disenfranchisement, were “vague and symbolic”.  All of 
Parliament’s objectives failed to identify “particular problems that require 
                                                        
21 Sauvé v Canada (Attorney-General), 1992 CanLII 2786 at para 14 (ON CA) 
22 Sauvé v Canada (Attorney-General), 1992 CanLII 2786 (ON CA). aff’d [1993] 2 
S.C.R. 438. See also Belczowski v Canada, [1992] 2 F.C. 440; (1992), 90 D.L.R. 
(4th) 330; 12 C.R. (4th) 219; 9 C.R.R. (2d) 14; 132 N.R. 183 (C.A.). 
23 Sauvé v Canada supra. n.2 at paragraph 55 
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denying the right to vote” and so “make the justification analysis more difficult.” 
The Chief Justice warned that “rhetorical” “abstract” or symbolic” objectives 
could dilute proportionality reasoning or result in “a contest of ‘our symbols are 
better than your symbols’ ”.24 Rather than dismissing the government’s 
objectives outright, the Court reluctantly moved to a proportionality analysis in 
order to demonstrate how “the difficulties inherent in the government’s stated 
objectives become manifest.”25 Unsurprisingly, the majority of the Court went on 
to find that there was no rational connection between the ends of enhancing the 
rule of law and civic responsibility and preventing and punishing crime, and the 
disenfranchisement of prisoners serving a sentence of two years imprisonment 
or more if they happen to be in prison when a general election occurs.  
Finnis has been very critical of suggestions in the majority’s judgment that the 
legitimacy of laws depends on a universal franchise that includes prisoners.  He 
notes that the Canadian court’s “proportionality analysis purporting to measure 
rational connection between aims and means” in the end “denied the very 
possibility of legitimately disenfranchising criminals or any criminal however 
gross or treasonable or subversive of elections”.26 He takes issue with any 
suggestion that the Canadian court’s decision can be justified philosophically and 
especially on the basis of social contract theory.  
We find the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach appealing compared with the 
more mechanical approach taken in the UK and ECtHR jurisprudence which 
focuses on the arbitrary question of what cut off should be used to define some 
subgroup of prisoners who have committed a crime that is serious enough to 
take away their vote.  These very different outcomes underline the continued 
dominance of Parliamentary supremacy in the UK and the margin of 
appreciation applied in supra-national law, compared with the Canadian 
approach, which has allotted, or at least accepted, a stronger role for the 
judiciary in the interpretation and enforcement of rights.27 The UK lacks “a 
culture of justification” in which government would be required to give reasons 
for its policies and legislation, justifying them in terms of rights protection.28  
                                                        
24 ibid at paragraphs 20- 24. 
25 Ibid at para 26. See also Roach, K. “The Varied Role of Courts and Legislatures 
in Rights Protection” in M. Hunt and H. Cooper (eds) Parliament and Rights 
(Oxford: Hart, 2015) at 414-415.  
26 John Finnis “Prisoners’ Voting Rights and Judges’ Power” supra n.3 at 18. 
27 For a comparison of the UK approach with South Africa, another country with 
a constitutional bill of rights, see Fredman, S. “From dialogue to deliberation” 
supra n.3. 
28 See, for example, Hunt, M. “Sovereignty’s Blight: Why Contemporary Public 
Law Needs the Concept of ‘Due Deference’” in N. Bamforth and P. Leyland (eds), 
Public Law in a Multi-layered Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003); Hunt, 
M. “The Impact of the Human Rights Act on the Legislature: A Diminution of 
Democracy or a New Voice for Parliament” [2010] European Human Rights Law 
Review 601.  Hunt’s work in this regard builds on the work of David Dyzenhaus 
“and in particular his efforts to build on Etienne Mureinik’s conception of legality 
as ‘a culture of justification’: see eg D Dyzenhaus, “Law as Justification: Etienne 
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This would engender a culture of accountability in which judges might be more 
confident in calling Parliament to account and so require it to justify its blanket 
ban on prisoner voting in the kind of detail required.  That said, courts do not 
have the power to strike down legislation inconsistent with the Human Rights 
Act 1998 and, the UK courts have continued their “tendency to defer when 
defining Convention rights”,29 leaving them reliant instead on the reasoning of 
the ECtHR which as a supra-national court applies a healthy margin of 
appreciation.  
In contrast, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms gives courts a clear 
mandate to strike down legislation that is not consistent with Charter rights. 
Moreover, the Canadian courts have interpreted section 1 of the Charter to 
require the state to justify incursions on rights as necessary to fulfil a 
governmental objective that is important enough to justify a limit on a right. The 
Canadian courts have played a robust role in enforcing Charter rights especially 
in the fifteen years after the Charter was enacted in 1982.  That said, the 2002 
Sauvé decision was closely divided with the four dissenting judges stressing the 
need to defer to Parliament’s choice of objectives and means with respect to 
prisoner disenfranchisement. Some would argue that judicial deference was 
warranted because the Court was interpreting the right to vote under the 
Charter, one of the few rights where legislatures cannot derogate or override 
Charter rights for a renewable five-year period. In any event, it is not clear that 
the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada would not defer today should the 
issue be put to it afresh.30    
The Canadian approach in Sauvé evaluates more critically Parliament’s 
objectives in enacting any prisoner disenfranchisement laws, suggesting that 
European courts and legislatures would be well advised to take a more 
substantive approach, which focuses not simply on which prisoners should be 
denied the vote, but on the reasons why any prisoners should be denied the vote. 
Parliamentary Debate and Deliberation on Prisoner Voting 
While the ECtHR became slowly less robust in its assertion of Hirst (No. 2), the 
UK government remained unmoved. On 20 December 2010, the Minister for 
                                                                                                                                                              
Mureinik’s Conception of Legal Culture’ (1998) 14 SAJHR 11.” (Hunt, cited in this 
note, 2003 at note 7). 
29 Young, A. “Accountability, Human Rights Adjudication and the Human Rights 
Act 1998” in N. Bamforth and P. Leyland (eds) Accountability in the 
Contemporary Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 155-179, 156,  
Young argues (at 162-3) that the courts’ conception of deference as respect 
sometimes collapses into deference as submission, undermining the application 
of proportionality as the standard of human rights review, contrary to what 
would be required by a culture of justification.  
30 Roach, K The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue 
revised ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2016) chs. 16 and 17 (arguments that Canadian 
attempts to appoint more deferential judges betray the logic of dialogic 
constitutionalism based on a culture of justification that requires the state to 
justify limits on rights). 
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Political and Constitutional Reform announced that the government would 
respond to the Hirst (No. 2) judgment by denying the right to vote only for those 
prisoners serving four years imprisonment or more. This cut off was justified 
partly because “four years has in the past been regarded as the distinction 
between short and long-term prisoners” and such a law would allow the 
government to comply with Hirst (No. 2) and avoid having to pay damage awards 
to prisoners denied the right to vote.31 In a sense, the four-year cut off would be 
similar to the two-year cut off in Canada. 
A backbench debate on 10 February 2011 resulted in a 234 to 22 vote in favour 
of a motion to re-affirm the complete ban on prisoner voting that had been found 
to breach the ECHR in Hirst (No. 2).  Although the Attorney General reminded 
Parliament of the UK’s obligations under the ECHR and the possibility that 
disenfranchised prisoners would receive damage awards, most members who 
spoke defended the total ban, often on the basis of Parliamentary supremacy, 
with one member arguing that the ECtHR could not force the UK to pay damages 
should they be awarded to disenfranchised prisoners.32 
After much delay, and on the date that suspension of individual claims ceased 
under the Greens and M.T. case (22 November 2012), the Government finally 
published a draft Bill, the Voting Eligibility (Prisoners) Draft Bill, for pre-
legislative scrutiny by a joint committee of the Houses of Commons and the 
Lords.  The Joint Committee on the Draft Voting Eligibility (Prisoners) Bill (the 
Joint Committee) reported on 18 December 2013.  Several options were under 
consideration by the Joint Committee: to make no change, or to impose 
restrictions based not on the nature or the seriousness of the offence, or the time 
until release, but on the length of prison sentence imposed – the options being 
more than four years or six months imprisonment. 
The eventual recommendation of the Joint Committee in the final report was that 
the government bring forward a Bill in order that prisoners serving 12 months 
or less be entitled to vote in the constituency where they were last registered; 
and that prisoners be entitled to register to vote six months prior to their release 
date.  This would permit 6,018 of the 66,591 prisoners serving a sentence in 
2014 the right to vote – less that one tenth.  If the threshold were four years, as 
originally stated by the Minister, this would enable a further 17,178 prisoners to 
vote – 35 per cent of the serving prison population.33  The government did not 
take forward the Joint Committee’s recommendation in the next Parliamentary 
session and shows no sign of doing so. 
                                                        
31 H.C. Deb 20 Dec 2010 c151WS 
32 Conservative MP Dominic Raab, supra n.11. Contrast this with the firm line 
attempted by the Minister for Political and Constitutional Reform only two 
months previously when he said of the proposed reform, “this is not a choice: it 
is a legal obligation.” HC Deb 20 Dec 2010 c150-151WS. 
33 Prison population by type of custody, age group and sex, 30 June 2002 to 30 
June 2014, England and Wales, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/.../prison-population-2014.xls 
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Despite the abject failure of the UK to make any progress in implementing the 
ECtHR ruling in Hirst (No. 2), the Council of Europe has been prepared to accept 
any excuse advanced for inaction. It expressed “profound concern and 
disappointment that the United Kingdom authorities did not introduce a Bill to 
parliament at the start of its 2014-2015 session as recommended by the 
appropriate committee”34 but nevertheless accepted the UK’s explanation that it 
“continues its active consideration of the most effective way to implement the 
judgment” and agreed that the matter would be discussed in September 2015, 
after the general election.35  However, the government again delayed taking 
action, this time to await the decision of the CJEU in a French case Delvigne,36 and 
by August 2015, there was not even the pretence of reform plans, only an 
affirmation of Parliament’s continued “widespread hostility” to prisoner voting 
and government’s belief that “this issue is ultimately a matter for elected 
representatives in national parliaments to decide.”37  
On 24 September 2015 the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers published 
a decision calling on the Government to respond to Hirst (No.2) as well as Greens 
and MT and McHugh, expressing “profound regret” that the blanket ban remains 
in place and there is no indication of how the UK intends to abide by the ECtHR 
judgment against it.38 An Interim Resolution on the same terms followed in 
December 2015.39 The then Justice Minister, Michael Gove, promised a response 
to the report of the Joint Committee on the Draft Voting Eligibility (Prisoners) Bill 
after publication of the Government’s consultation document on reforming the 
Human Rights Act in 2016.  This is yet to materialise and the government agenda 
may well alter with the new Prime Minister taking office in July 2016.40 
The UK Supreme Court’s 2013 Chester Decision 
As Parliament continued to delay responding to Hirst (No. 2), the UK government 
in R (on the application of Chester) v Secretary of State for Justice41 asked the UK 
Supreme Court not to follow Hirst (No. 2). All of the judges declined this 
invitation noting that while the issue of prisoner disenfranchisement was 
controversial, it was not such a fundamental part of UK law as to require that the 
                                                        
34 1208DH meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, 25 September 2014. 
35 Letter from the UK Permanent Representative of the UK Delegation to the 
Council of Europe, 5 June 2014. 
36 Case C-650/13 Thierry Delvigne v Commune de Lesparre-Médoc, Préfet de la 
Gironde [2015] CJEU (final judgment). 
37 Letter from the UK Deputy Permanent Representative of the UK Delegation to 
the Council of Europe, 6 August 2015. 
38 Decision of the Committee of Ministers, 1236th meeting, 24 September 2015. 
39 Interim Resolution CM/ResDH(2015)251 adopted by the Committee of 
Ministers on 9 December 2015 at the 1243rd meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies. 
40 In the meantime, the EU Justice Sub-Committee published its report on The UK, 
the EU and a British Bill of Rights in May 2016 (European Union Committee, 12th 
Report of Session 2015-16, 9 May 2016). Despite the report’s conclusions, the 
government has announced that it will consider reforming the HRA. 
41 [2013] UKSC 63, paragraph 35 
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ECtHR jurisprudence not be followed. Lord Mance observed in the lead judgment 
(at paragraph 34): 
Nothing in Scoppola therefore suggests that the Grand Chamber would 
revise its view in Hirst (No 2) to the point where it would accept the United 
Kingdom’s present general ban. There is on this point no prospect of any 
further meaningful dialogue between United Kingdom Courts and 
Strasbourg. 
For our purposes, the important point is that the Supreme Court followed Hirst 
(No. 2) in accepting at face value that the government’s objectives for prisoner 
disenfranchisement - namely punishing prisoners and enhancing civic 
responsibility and the rule of law - were legitimate. In short, the Supreme Court 
simply accepted that restrictions on the right of at least some, and perhaps most, 
prisoners to vote could be easily justified. 
Lady Hale in her opinion noted that while any prisoner disenfranchisement 
would have arbitrary qualities, she had “no sympathy at all for either of the 
appellants” because as persons convicted of murder, she could not “envisage any 
law which the United Kingdom might eventually pass on this subject which 
would grant either of them the right to vote”.42 This approach demonstrates the 
type of unthinking deference to the objectives of prisoner disenfranchisement 
that we have criticized above. Unlike the Canadian court, the UK Supreme Court 
assumed that vague objectives of increasing punishment and affirming respect 
for the rule of law would justify, at the very least, prisoner disenfranchisement of 
those convicted of serious offences.43 Like the ECtHR, the Court has essentially 
glossed over the logically and ethically prior question of whether there is a good 
reason to deny any prisoner a vote, and in a mechanical, superficial and 
inevitably arbitrary manner, focused instead on which sentence cut-off can be 
accepted as a proportionate restriction on the right to vote. 
One final point merits mention.  The UK Supreme Court, like the ECtHR, 
demonstrated remedial deference in the face of the UK’s government continued 
refusal to respond to Hirst (No. 2). Specifically, it held that “there was no point”44 
in issuing another declaration of incompatibility under s.4 of the HRA, both 
because one had previously been issued and because the two applicants, both 
serving sentences for murder, could “with considerable confidence”45 be denied 
the vote under the evolving Strasburg jurisprudence. The Court also decided that 
European Union law did not provide the applicants with the right to vote, but 
even if it did, a declaration and damages should not be issued as a remedy, for 
similar reasons related to the proportionality of denying the vote to those such 
as the applicants who had been convicted of the most serious offences.46  This 
                                                        
42 ibid paragraph 99 
43 In failing to consider the nature of the rationale for disenfranchisement and so 
its link with the offence or the offender, this also excludes any consideration of 
rehabilitation – a factor which the ECtHR took account of in Scoppola. 
44 Chester paragraph 39 
45 ibid paragraph 40. 
46 ibid paragraphs 73 and 83. 
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decision to disapply EU law has been criticized as contrary to the usual position 
when there is a finding of incompatibility.47 As suggested above, it is difficult to 
escape the conclusion that the remedial deference of both the Strasbourg court 
and the UK Supreme Court effectively rewarded Parliament for its failure to 
respond to Hirst (No. 2). 
The European Court of Justice Decision in Delvigne  
In Thierry Delvigne v Commune de Lesparre-Médoc, Préfet de la Gironde, Thierry 
Delvigne sought to challenge the indefinite removal of his right to vote in 
European elections.48  The outcome of this case was potentially of greater 
significance than those heard by the ECtHR, because the CJEU was hearing the 
matter under EU law and its decisions are legally binding on all EU Member 
States.49  The Court found (at paragraph 46) that whilst a ban on voting was a 
clear limitation of Article 39(2) of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights, this 
was permissible: 
as long as the limitations are provided for by law, respect the essence of 
those rights and freedoms and, subject to the principle of proportionality, 
are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest 
recognised by the European Union or the need to protect the rights and 
freedoms of others. 
It added (at paragraph 48) that the limitation under French law is provided for 
by law; it  
respects the essence of the right to vote referred to in Article 39(2) of the 
Charter…since it has the effect of excluding certain persons, under specific 
conditions and on account of their conduct, from those entitled to vote in 
elections to the Parliament, as long as those conditions are fulfilled. 
It is proportionate “in so far as it takes into account the nature and the gravity of 
the criminal offence committed and the duration of the penalty.”50  Furthermore, 
there was a right of review, where Mr Delvigne could apply to have his rights 
reinstated. The right of the convicted person to apply to have this additional 
penalty of loss of civic rights removed, however, introduces the possibility of 
case-by-case judicial decision-making on the merits of prisoner 
disenfranchisement.51 It will be suggested below that if disenfranchisement can 
be justified as a form of punishment, it will likely require case-by-case treatment. 
                                                        
47 See Professor Michael Dougan’s evidence to the Select Committee on the 
European Union Justice Sub-Committee, Potential Impact on EU Law of 
Repealing Human Rights Act, Evidence Session No.6, Response to Question 61. 
48 supra n.36. 
49 The UK Supreme Court resisted the request for a preliminary ruling from the 
ECJ in a similar case, Chester, supra. n.4, discussed above. Since the UK 
referendum decision in June 2016, to leave the EU, the future significance of CJEU 
decisions in UK law is unclear. 
50 Delvigne  at paragraph 49. 
51 Under Art 702-1 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure. 
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The Court followed the thin proportionality approach seen in both Hirst (No. 2) 
and Chester by assuming that the Charter did not preclude “legislation of a 
Member State…from excluding, by operation of law…persons who…were 
convicted of a serious crime”.52 This assumes that disenfranchisement can be 
justified either as a form of punishment for serious crime or as a form of 
enhancing respect for the rule of law and civic responsibility, without examining 
whether these objectives are important enough to take away the right to vote, or 
would actually be achieved by prisoner disenfranchisement. 
Although opening up a new and potentially stronger avenue of challenge (for the 
moment at least), the decision does not differ substantively from Hirst (No. 2) or 
Chester in not examining seriously the legitimacy of the government’s objectives 
in disenfranchising prisoners.53  
A More Substantive Approach: Scrutinising the Objectives of Prisoner 
Disenfranchisement 
In what follows, we focus on the objectives so far put forward by the UK 
government to justify prisoner disenfranchisement and we argue that while 
accepted by the European and UK courts, they are all problematic under the 
more substantive Canadian approach to scrutinizing the legitimacy of legislative 
objectives. We recognize that this does not constitute a full normative 
justification of prisoner voting, the scope of which is beyond this paper, but we 
do suggest that it should encourage both Parliament and the courts to eschew 
the impoverished “pick a number” approach to prisoner disenfranchisement that 
they have so far been pursuing. In other words, we remain open, albeit sceptical, 
to the possibility that prisoner disenfranchisement could in theory be justified.  
It is noteworthy in this regard that the Canadian court has not been as absolutist 
on prisoner disenfranchisement as is commonly perceived. In 1996, the Supreme 
Court of Canada accepted disenfranchisement, as well as bans on holding public 
office, as a specific sanction for those who commit electoral fraud.54 This decision 
was not overruled by the 2002 Sauvé case. We suggest that both the Government 
and courts should revisit the substantive justifications for prisoner 
disenfranchisement before simply accepting as proportionate anything short of a 
total ban on prisoner voting. 
Prisoner Disenfranchisement Protecting of the Rule of Law and Promoting Civic 
Responsibility  
The UK government has advanced several arguments defending its position on 
prisoner voting.  It claims that offending of the level of gravity that attracts a 
prison term, amounts to a breach of the social contract and so removes the 
entitlement or ‘moral authority’ to participate in the democratic process until 
                                                        
52 Paragraph 52. 
53 It is likely that this avenue of challenge will be closed off again if the UK leaves 
the EU. 
54 Harvey v New Brunswick (Attorney General),  [1996] 2 S.C.R. 876. We discuss 
disenfranchisement as a possible punishment below. 
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that sentence has been served.55  As the Ministry of Justice explained in a 2009 
consultation paper: 
…the removal of the right to vote…is not only a punitive measure…it goes to 
the essence of the offender’s relationship with democratic society.  Its 
removal underlines to the prisoner the importance of that relationship, and 
his breach of it in committing a serious crime.  The reinstatement of the 
right marks his re-entry into society is aimed at enhancing his sense of civil 
responsibility and respect for the rule of law.56 
The Government argues that this policy pursues legitimate aims of respect for 
the rule of law, and in applying only to those whose offending is sufficiently 
serious to merit a prison term, it is proportionate.  
The Canadian Supreme Court in the case of Sauvé v Canada was not persuaded 
by similar breach of the social contract arguments. Chief Justice McLachlin  
concluded for the majority that while all must obey the law, there was: 
a vital symbolic, theoretical and practical connection between having a 
voice in making the law and being obliged to obey it.  This connection, 
inherited from social contract theory and enshrined in the Charter, stands 
at the heart of our system of constitutional democracy… A government that 
restricts the franchise to a select portion of citizens is a government that 
weakens its ability to function as the legitimate representative of the 
excluded citizens, jeopardizes its claim to representative democracy, and 
erodes the basis of its right to convict and punish law-breakers.57 
The above approach implicitly rejects the idea that a prisoner who has 
committed a crime has violated the social contract in a manner that enables the 
state to respond by denying the franchise to the offender. In other words, it 
presumes a more durable social contract than that contemplated by the UK 
government when it has defended prisoner disenfranchisement on the basis of 
social contract theory.  
We recognize that the Canadian court’s argument that social contract theory 
supports prisoners being able to vote has come under heavy criticism, most 
notably from John Finnis. Finnis argues that philosophers from Kant to Mill to 
HLA Hart to John Rawls would all accept prisoner disenfranchisement on the 
basis of the reciprocity between social rights and duties. But this makes no 
argument as to why some rights should be removed from prisoners and not 
                                                        
55 Baroness Scotland, the Home Office Minister in the House of Lords told the 
House that: “It has been the view of successive governments that prisoners 
convicted of a crime serious enough to warrant imprisonment have lost the 
moral authority to vote.” H.L. Deb 20 October 2003 c143 WA. 
56 Voting Rights of Convicted Prisoners Detained within the United Kingdom – 
Second Stage Consultation. Consultation Paper CP6/09, 8 April 2009, paragraph 
23. 
57 Sauvé v Canada supra n.2 at paragraphs 31, 34 
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others.58 To be sure, prisoners have broken a bond with their community, but 
that is why they are being punished. As the majority in Sauvé argued, the idea 
that prisoners because they are prisoners are outside of the social contract 
would seem to have no logical end. Chief Justice McLachlin argued that if 
imprisonment justified denying the right to vote there was “no credible theory” 
why this logic could not be extended to other rights such as the prisoner’s right 
to freedom of expression or religion.59  
The argument based on breaching the social contract advances no basis for the 
assertion that the right to vote should be subject to standards of good 
behaviour.60 The modern trend is towards a more expansive franchise. Although 
it was once assumed that only men who owned property were informed enough 
to vote, we now generally allow all citizens to vote without regard to how well-
informed or worthy they are or their level of education. Given this, it is not clear 
why prisoners should be the only group denied the franchise on the basis of their 
worthiness to vote. The Canadian court concluded that “the idea that certain 
classes of people are not morally fit or morally worthy to vote and to participate 
in the law-making process is ancient and obsolete”, related to historically 
discriminatory practices and inconsistent with the equal dignity of all.61 
Professor Finnis has suggested that Chief Justice McLachlin ignored what he 
characterized as “what previous generations, with philosophical support, judged 
to be prudence and justice”62 but this hardly takes away from the point that 
demanding voters be worthy is ancient, obsolete and in tension with modern 
ideas of equality. If the government is truly prepared to limit the vote to only the 
worthy, then they should pursue such objectives across the broad and attempt to 
disenfranchise those who are not informed or those who have only the most 
tenuous connection to the country in which they cast a ballot. A government 
objective such as reserving the vote to those who respect the social contract or 
the rule of law should be applied in a non-discriminatory and rational manner 
that does not simply pick on prisoners because they are easily identifiable. 
                                                        
58 Convicted prisoners are allowed to exercise other civic rights, such as the right 
to marry.  Due process rights are not lost even when criminal liability is admitted 
or established. 
59 Sauvé n. 2 at paragraph 46. 
60 Our discussion of prisoner voting is framed in terms of rights, as we are 
concerned here with breaches of Convention rights.  In some jurisdictions, 
however, voting might be conceived of not in the language of rights, but as a 
power, a privilege, or even a responsibility or a duty.  Where voting is a legal 
duty, as is the case in Australia, one consequence of prisoner disenfranchisement 
is to deny convicted prisoners their chance to do their duty as citizens and so the 
opportunity to signal their desire to re-establish themselves as responsible 
citizens.  This seems an even more compelling argument for the need to establish 
clear grounds to prohibit prisoner voting, when it is framed as a citizen-duty. 
61 Sauvé n.2 at paragraphs 43-44. 
62 John Finnis “Prisoners’ Voting Rights and Judges’ Power” supra n.3 at 26 note 
6. 
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Professor Finnis’ argument that “allowing criminals to vote during incarceration 
under sentences says to each of the law-abiding that your vote … does not count 
very much….” is an emotive argument that does not hold up. The act of a prisoner 
voting harms no one.  Many societies including the UK and Canada conduct 
elections based on the universal franchise but without ensuring that ridings all 
have equal populations and consequently every vote has an equal weight. 
Professor Finnis’ real argument against prisoner voting is his sense that prisoner 
voting is “decadent”.63 In other words, his objection seems rooted in an 
emotional sense of offence - or what Lord Devlin would have called disgust - at 
the thought of prisoners voting.  As one of us has argued elsewhere, disgust at 
the notion that some people can exercise a right is not an important enough 
objective to deny that right. 64   
Thought should also be given to the reality that in a system that no longer uses 
capital punishment or exile by transportation as a form of punishment,  
prisoners remain part of the social contract, like it or not. Offenders should be 
punished for their offence and their rights such as liberty will be denied to the 
extent necessary for their imprisonment, but they remain citizens. Excluding 
prisoners from exercising political rights that are not inconsistent with 
imprisonment is to reinforce their status as outsiders and passive objects.65   
Disenfranchisement as Additional Punishment 
Part of Parliament’s justification for prisoner disenfranchisement, assisted by 
dicta in Hirst (No. 2) and Scoppola, is that disenfranchisement is required to 
punish prisoners. This rationale no doubt appeals to the unpopularity of 
offenders. Nevertheless, it does not hold up to rational analysis based on any of 
the objectives of punishment.  
Disenfranchisement will not assist in the rehabilitation of offenders, indeed it is 
argued that it achieves the reverse, by isolating and excluding prisoners; nor 
their incapacitation; nor does it serve as a deterrent.66  The Court in Hirst (No. 2) 
noted that the punitive aims of disenfranchisement were not met in that case as 
the ban applied after the punitive part of the sentence had been served, but the 
applicant was further detained on public protection grounds.  
The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in Sauvé concluded that punishing 
people by denying them their right to vote was not an appropriate form of 
punishment. In part, the Court stressed the arbitrary nature of legislative 
disenfranchisement in relation to the legitimate ends of punishment because a 
prisoner would be disenfranchised: 
                                                        
63 John Finnis “Judicial Law-Making” supra n.3 at 101 (emphasis in the original) 
64 Roach, K. “The Varied Role of Courts and Legislatures in Rights Protection” 
65 See A. Duff and S. Marshall “Civic Punishment” in A. Dzur, I. Loader and R. 
Sparks (eds) Democracy and Mass Incarceration OUP, 2016. 
66 As a side issue, it is noted that prisoners are not in general concerned to be 
able to vote and few of those who can vote, do so.  Some MPs have questioned 
the value of right that is not valued by those to whom it might attach.  Is the 
value of a human right in any way dependent on our desire or ability to exercise 
it? 
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regardless of the particular crimes they committed, the harm they caused, 
or the normative character of their conduct.  It is not individually tailored 
to the particular offender’s act.  It does not, in short, meet the 
requirements of denunciatory, retributive punishment. It follows that it is 
not rationally connected to the goal of imposing legitimate punishment.67 
The logical implication of this reasoning, consistent with Hirst (No. 2) but not 
subsequent ECtHR jurisprudence, is that disenfranchisement could only be 
justified as punishment on a case-by-case and offender-by-offender basis. This is 
a more reasoned approach than found in ECtHR cases which casually accept 
without question, that disenfranchisement of large groups of prisoners is an 
acceptable form of punishment. 
Prisoner disenfranchisement in the UK and as it was used in Canada is not linked 
to the blameworthiness of, nor the harm caused by, the offender. It is simply tied 
to the length of the sentence, something only roughly related to offence 
seriousness, plus the happenstance of when an election is called. If this is 
punishment, it is an arbitrary form of punishment that is not related to the 
offender’s actions, motivation, or the consequences of the offence. Such arbitrary 
prisoner disenfranchisement should embarrass retributivists who otherwise 
assert that the punishment must be carefully calibrated to fit the crime. 
The Canadian approach draws an important distinction between punishing 
prisoners as a group (or even subsections of prisoners) and punishing offenders 
for particular crimes. The former is a suspect form of symbolic and rhetorical 
“penal populism” while the latter is a traditional and legitimate function of the 
criminal justice system.  If Parliament is serious about disenfranchisement as 
punishment then there should be, as hinted in Hirst (No. 2) but thereafter 
rejected, an offender-by-offender approach or at least an approach tied to the 
commission of specific crimes. 
The Canadian jurisprudence contains a much more extensive and critical 
examination of the alleged objectives of prison disenfranchisement than found in 
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR or indeed in subsequent cases decided by the UK 
Supreme Court and the CJEU. It asks what in our view is the right and logically 
prior question: why should prisoners be denied the vote? It rejects reliance on 
mechanical or impoverished proportionality analysis that supports anything 
short of a blanket ban. Chief Justice McLachlin refused to reduce proportionality 
to a facile “pick a number” approach and was not persuaded when the 
government’s answer to the question of ‘why a two year period?’ was simply 
“because it affects a smaller class than would a blanket disenfranchisement.”68  
We recognize that there will be disagreement about whether prisoner 
disenfranchisement can be justified on social contract, rule of law, civic 
responsibility or punishment rationales. Professor Finnis in particular would 
accept both the social contract and punishment rationales for prisoner 
disenfranchisement that the Canadian courts have found deficient. Regardless of 
where one stands in such a debate, it should be appreciated that the legitimacy 
                                                        
67 Sauvé supra n.2 at paragraph 51. 
68 Sauvé v Canada at para 55. 
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(or not) of Parliament’s objectives for disenfranchisement are the real and 
substantive point in issue. This helps explain why neither proponents or 
opponents of prisoner disenfranchisement are likely to be satisfied by the 
impoverished “pick a number” approach to prisoner disenfranchisement that is 
being promoted in both UK courts and its Parliament.  
Conclusion 
This article has sought to bring new light to the prisoner disenfranchisement 
debate by arguing that European and British courts have too readily accepted 
legislative objectives related to punishment, enhancing respect for the rule of 
law and civic responsibility as legitimate reasons for denying prisoners the vote. 
The debate in courts and Parliament has moved too quickly and in an arbitrary 
direction that seems to boil down to a “pick a number, any number” approach to 
prisoner disenfranchisement. This may also reveal a more general weakness in 
proportionality analysis that focuses on questions of means and often glosses 
over the logically prior question of the legitimacy of ends.  
These approaches reflect, to some extent, the different constitutional contexts in 
which the ECtHR, the UK and the Canadian courts operate.  Canadian courts have 
a clear constitutional mandate to strike down laws that have not been justified as 
reasonable limits on Charter rights enacted for objectives that are important 
enough to limit rights. In contrast, UK courts do not have strike down powers 
under the Human Rights Act, 1998. In addition, the ECtHR plays a secondary role 
to that of national courts in relation to rights protection. Given the lack of 
consensus in European states about prisoner disenfranchisement, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that the ECtHR applies a relatively generous margin of appreciation 
on this issue, but it has retreated even from this both substantively and 
remedially.  The UK’s hostility to the ECtHR, including accusations that the Court 
has overstepped its jurisdiction, has resulted in a political stalemate.  The UK has 
refused to implement the judgment in Hirst and the ECtHR has back-tracked 
from its original ruling in an attempt to retain some semblance of authority and 
avoid pushing the UK towards leaving the Council of Europe.  Coupled with the 
UK courts’ reluctance to challenge policy and legislative reasoning and to issue 
additional declarations of incompatibility or damage awards for continued 
prisoner disenfranchisement, we are left with a remedial vacuum 
The Canadian Supreme Court in Sauvé, though quoted with approval in Hirst (No. 
2), took what we find to be a more critical, substantive and helpful approach to 
this question and found that the objectives offered in that case (enhancing 
respect for the rule of law and punishment and implicitly responding to a breach 
of social contract) were all too “vague”, “symbolic” and “rhetorical” to justify 
restricting the fundamental right to vote. To be sure, the Canadian court did not 
stop there and also applied a form of proportionality analysis, but its conclusion 
that Canada’s restrictions on prisoners serving two years imprisonment was 
disproportionate was not particularly convincing given that two years serves as 
a conventional and long-standing marker of serious offences in Canada. Indeed 
as the UK Supreme Court recognized in Chester, there is an arbitrary nature to 




Not enough attention has been paid either in UK courts or Parliament to the 
logically and ethically prior question of why any prisoners should be denied the 
vote. Instead both courts and Parliament have focused on the arbitrary and 
somewhat mechanical question of what group of prisoners should be denied the 
vote. With respect, this puts the cart before the horse. We would encourage both 
Parliamentarians and judges to pay more attention to the legitimacy of the 
legislative objectives behind prisoner disenfranchisement and suggest that they 
might find the Canadian jurisprudence instructive in this regard.  
                                                        
69 Professor Finnis has expressed skepticism about the courts drawing a line 
“between disenfranchising eight per cent of convicted criminals-unlawful! And 
disenfranchising (say) five per cent of them- lawful! or between the whole class 
of one-year sentences and the whole class of three-year sentences….” John Finnis 
“Judicial Law-Making” supra n.3 at 102. 
